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Abstract. We construct a parsimonious model of a ￿nancial market
where the marginal investor is an endogenous noise trader. Such a trader antici-
pates that future shocks may force him to exit his position. In compensation he
requires a higher return. We show that the original seller of the asset pays the
required return. This can only be optimal if the seller has access to an investment
opportunity that gives a su¢ ciently high return, compared to the noise trader￿ s
investment opportunities. We also show that, if the noise trader expects to get
informative signals, the required return does not necessarily decrease, as claimed
in the earlier literature.
Keywords: Market microstructure, no-trade theorems, adverse selection
JEL Classi￿cation: G14.
1. Introduction
Bagehot (1971) was one of the ￿rst to note that market makers face a problem when
trading with informed traders. Since informed traders can choose not to trade if the
prices do not suit them, market makers will never gain from trading with them - and
might sometimes lose. This adverse selection problem may lead to market making not
being viable, and markets may break down. However, Bagehot1 also suggested that
exogenously motivated traders, or so called noise traders, could provide the market
maker with enough gains to compensate for the losses on informed traders.
Noise traders have ever since played an important role in the market microstruc-
ture literature. Indeed Black (1986) concluded that ￿[n]oise makes trading in ￿nancial
markets possible￿ . In the model of Copeland and Galai (1983), and in the dynamic
extension of Glosten and Milgrom (1985), they are needed for the market maker to
￿nance losses to informed traders. In Kyle (1985) noise traders provide camou￿ age
for a monopolistic informed trader. Noise traders, under the guise of an exogenously
changing supply, ensure that prices are somewhat ine¢ cient in Grossman and Stiglitz
(1980). This allows for informed traders to recover information costs.2
￿I am grateful to the Wallenberg Foundation for ￿nancial support. I am also grateful for comments
from CØdric Argenton, Milo Bianchi, Andrei Simonov, and J￿rgen Weibull. Any errors are my own.
1The article was written pseudonymously by Jack Treynor.
2Shleifer and Summers (1990) give an outline of the noise trader approach to ￿nance. Recent
surveys of the market microstructure literature are O￿ Hara (1995), Madhavan (2000), Brunnermeier
(2001), Stoll (2003), and Biais, Glosten, and Spatt (2005).
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The need for noise traders in models of ￿nancial markets can also be understood as a
way of side-stepping the various no-trade theorems, among which Milgrom and Stokey
(1982) and Tirole (1982) are the most well-known. The principle behind these theorems
follows from Aumann (1976): ￿If two people have the same priors, and their posteriors
for an event A are common knowledge, then these posteriors are equal.￿Translated into
the world of ￿nancial markets, this means that, given the above assumptions, these two
people must agree on the price of an asset. As a result, they may trade - even if they
start o⁄from a Pareto optimal allocation - but they will be indi⁄erent between trading
and not trading. Thus, as soon as any costs of trading are introduced, there will be no
trade. At least one participant will lose from trading, and will then prefer not to trade.
The costs may be transaction costs, information costs, or, as in Milgrom and Stokey
(1982), remuneration for risk.
A problem with the noise trader approach is that noise traders systematically lose
money. As discussed in Dow and Gorton (2006), this has led to a literature trying to
endogenize noise traders as rational agents. Various approaches have been considered.
Diamond and Verrecchia (1981) suggest that noise traders may trade for insurance
reasons. De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldman (1990) consider the possibility
that arbitrageurs have a limited time horizon. This results in a limited arbitrage that
makes it possible for noise traders to survive. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) elaborate on
this idea and consider agency problems. They consider a situation where an arbitrageur
borrows money from an uninformed investor. As the investor is uninformed, he tries to
conjecture whether the arbitrageur￿ s positions are sound or not by observing returns.
A temporary shock can then lead to the investor recalling the money, although the
arbitrageur￿ s position is fundamentally sound. Another approach, also based on the
agency problem, has been developed by Dow and Gorton (1997). They note that a fund
manager might trade excessively to appear informed to his investors. This excessive
trade results in a systematic loss that would correspond to the loss of noise traders.
In this paper, we will consider yet another approach, based on the notion of required
return. According to this approach, the noise trader anticipates his future trading
losses when selling the asset, and thus demands a discount when buying the asset. The
argument can be traced back to Amihud and Mendelson (1986) who argued that, since
the bid-ask spread is a trading cost, it should be positively correlated with the expected
return. G￿rleanu and Pedersen (2004) further developed the argument by arguing that
if the bid-ask spread was caused by adverse selection, as claimed by Copeland and
Galai (1983), then traders would demand a higher return if they expected to exit their
position due to a liquidity shock, but a lower return if they expected to exit due to
private information. As a result, G￿rleanu and Pedersen argued, the two e⁄ects can
cancel each other, and only when the liquidity signal and the informational signal are
in con￿ ict will an actual cost be incurred.
We extend the model of Copeland and Galai (1983) with the aim to construct
the simplest model possible to endogenize noise traders. In section 2, we illustrate
the adverse selection problem in a simple model with risk neutral players, but where
informative signals are costly. We show that without noise traders, no costly information
will be acquired. However, if exogenous noise traders are introduced, then information
costs can be covered. In section 3, we extend the model to endogenize the noise traders.ENDOGENOUS NOISE TRADERS 3
Anticipating that they may have to exit their position at a loss, they will only enter
it at a discount. Furthermore, we can analyze the e⁄ect of the competitive structure
among informed traders. It turns out that if the informed trader is a monopolist, then
the seller will have to ￿nance his pro￿t. However, a monopolistic informed trader will
choose a lower precision than if he were competitive. As a result, the seller does not
have to compensate the noise trader to the same extent. Thus, the unambiguous result,
if information costs are convex in the precision, is that the seller￿ s costs increase if the
informed trader is competitive. In section 4, we allow the noise trader to be partly
informed, just as in G￿rleanu and Pedersen (2004). We consider two cases. In the
￿rst case, the noise trader becomes informed by buying the asset. Then G￿rleanu and
Pedersen￿ s conjecture is always true - i.e. the required return falls. In the second case,
the noise trader is informed already before buying the asset. Despite the fact that he
has not actually received the informative signal - he only knows that he will receive it
- this in￿ uences his opportunity cost. As a result he is not ready to pay as high a price
as he would as uninformed. Thus, G￿rleanu and Pedersen￿ s conjecture will only be true
for some parameter values.
2. Adverse selection
2.1. The model. The adverse selection problem on ￿nancial markets can be illus-
trated as follows. Let us assume that we have an informed trader (IT) and a competitive
market maker (M);3 and that the timing of the game is as follows:
1. Nature draws a fundamental value for the asset v 2 f0;1g with equal probability.
The realization is not observed by anybody.
2. The informed trader chooses a precision ￿ 2 [1=2;1] for a signal to be received in









= 0; and c0 (￿);c00 (￿) > 0.
3. The competitive market maker observes ￿ and announces ask and bid prices
pA;pB 2 [0;1].
4. The informed trader gets the signal s 2 f0;1g; where
Pr(v = 1 j s = 1) = Pr(v = 0 j s = 0) = ￿
Pr(v = 0 j s = 1) = Pr(v = 1 j s = 0) = 1 ￿ ￿:
He observes the bid-ask prices and chooses whether to buy, sell, or do nothing.
His strategy set is thus SIT = fB;S;Ng:
5. The asset expires and all trades clear at the fundamental value v. More precisely,
the market maker and the informed trader reverse their trade, if there was a trade,
at the price v:
The players are rational and risk neutral. There is no time discounting and the
reservation value is 0. We allow for both long and short positions, and for futures
contracts, if a prospective short seller can not borrow an asset.
3We do not model why the market maker is competitive. However, as discussed in Glosten and
Milgrom (1985) it may be a result of competition with other limit orders or with another market maker
at the same, or another exchange.ENDOGENOUS NOISE TRADERS 4
2.2. Analysis. The only subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in this game is for the
informed trader to not pay an information cost and thus receive an uninformative signal.
To see this, let us solve the game by backward induction.
In 4; IT￿ s conditional payo⁄s are
E [￿IT j s = 1;B] = ￿(1 ￿ pA) + (1 ￿ ￿)(0 ￿ pA) ￿ c
E [￿IT j s = 1;S] = ￿(pB ￿ 1) + (1 ￿ ￿)(pB ￿ 0) ￿ c
E [￿IT j s = 1;N] = ￿c
E [￿IT j s = 0;B] = ￿(0 ￿ pA) + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ pA) ￿ c
E [￿IT j s = 0;S] = ￿(pB ￿ 0) + (1 ￿ ￿)(pB ￿ 1) ￿ c
E [￿IT j s = 0;N] = ￿c:
Thus, if IT gets the signal s = 1, then with probability ￿ it is correct, and by buying
he would get the payo⁄ (1 ￿ pA): With probability 1 ￿ ￿ it is incorrect and then he
would get the payo⁄(0 ￿ pA): The information costs are sunk, so if IT does not trade,
then his payo⁄ is ￿c:
Thus, IT weakly gains from buying if
pA ￿ ￿ and s = 1; (1)
and from selling if
pB ￿ 1 ￿ ￿ and s = 0: (2)
In 3; the competitive market maker will set bid-ask prices so that they by themselves
result in an expected pro￿t of zero. He takes the reversed position of the informed trader








(pB ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)) = 0: (4)
Reshu› ing, we get the equilibrium bid-ask prices
p
￿
A = ￿ (5)
p
￿
B = 1 ￿ ￿: (6)
It follows immediately that these bid-ask prices satisfy conditions (1) ￿ (2): In other
words, if the market maker sets prices so as to achieve zero pro￿ts when trading, then
the informed trader will trade according to his signal.4
In 2; IT￿ s expected pro￿t is






(pA ￿ pB) ￿ c(￿): (7)
4Anticipating IT0s trading decision in 4, the market maker can also achieve zero pro￿ts by setting
pA ￿ ￿ and pB ￿ 1￿￿; where at least one inequality is strict. Then pro￿ts will be zero for the simple
reason that IT will not trade on at least one side. Since we interpret the market maker￿ s zero pro￿t
condition as resulting from competition, we disregard this possibility.ENDOGENOUS NOISE TRADERS 5
Inserting the bid-ask prices; we get
E [￿IT] = ￿c(￿): (8)
Thus, the only information cost that IT can cover is c = 0: The reason is that M will
never announce prices so that he makes a loss on expectation, but then IT can never
cover strictly positive information costs.
Exogenous noise traders. The standard approach to solving this dilemma is to
assume that some traders trade for exogenous reasons. This type of traders are usually
called liquidity traders or noise traders. In this paper we have chosen the term noise
traders.
Let us assume that noise traders trade with the probability ￿ > 0 on the ask side,
and with probability ￿ > 0 on the bid side. Then the competitive market maker faces




















(pB ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)) = 0: (10)






￿ + 1 ￿ ￿
2￿ + 1
: (12)
Again it is easy to see that these bid-ask prices satisfy conditions (1) ￿ (2): Fur-
thermore, in 2; IT￿ s expected pro￿t is














It is weakly positive if
(2￿ ￿ 1)
2
(￿ + ￿ + 4￿￿)
(2￿ + 1)(2￿ + 1)
￿ c(￿): (14)
Thus, if only ￿ > 1=2; i.e. if the signal is informative, then a positive information cost
can be covered - provided it is su¢ ciently low.
Thus the introduction of exogenous noise traders makes it possible to ￿nance costly
information acquisition. On the other hand, since these noise traders trade for exoge-
nous reasons, we have pushed the actual source of ￿nancing outside the model. The
objective with the concept of required return is to bring it inside the model. In the
next section we will show how that may be done.ENDOGENOUS NOISE TRADERS 6
3. Required return
The main idea with the concept of required return is that if the noise trader anticipates
that he might have to exit the asset at a cost, then he will only enter at a discount. Note,
however, that this implies that only the noise trader on the bid side in the previous
example can be endogenized. A noise trader on the ask side, if he is rational, would
still sell for some exogenous reason.
3.1. The model. Let us imagine a game with four representative types; a seller
(S), a noise trader (NT), an informed trader (IT), and a competitive market maker
(M): The timing of the model is as follows.
1. The seller gives the noise trader a take-it-or-leave-it o⁄er to buy one unit of an
asset for p0 2 [0;1]. The seller will use the funds to ￿nance a project with an
expected return E [rS] > 0:
2. The noise trader decides whether to accept the seller￿ s o⁄er or not.
3. Nature draws a fundamental value for the asset v 2 f0;1g with equal probability.
The realization is not observed by anybody.
4. The informed trader chooses a precision ￿ 2 [1=2;1] for the signal that he will









= 0; and c0 (￿);c00 (￿) > 0.
5. The competitive market maker observes ￿ and announces ask and bid prices
pA;pB 2 [0;1].
6. The informed trader gets the signal s 2 f0;1g; where
Pr(v = 1 j s = 1) = Pr(v = 0 j s = 0) = ￿
Pr(v = 0 j s = 1) = Pr(v = 1 j s = 0) = 1 ￿ ￿:
He observes the bid-ask prices and chooses whether to buy, sell, or do nothing.
His strategy set is thus SIT = fB;S;Ng: With probability ￿ the noise trader
gets a shock and must sell for pB: With probability 1￿￿ the noise trader gets no
shock and keeps the asset.
7. The asset expires and all trades clear at the fundamental value v. More precisely,
the market maker and the informed trader reverse their trade, if there was a trade,
at the price v: The asset is bought by the seller for the price v.
Thus, compared to the previous model we have added two players, who each make
decisions before trading occurred in the previous model.
We have an endogenous noise trader. He might receive a shock in 6, which hinders
him to keep the asset to maturity. However, he anticipates this shock when deciding at
which price he is ready to buy the asset in 2.
We also have a seller of the asset, who might sell the asset to the noise trader in 2.
The seller can be interpreted either as the issuer of the asset, for example at an IPO,ENDOGENOUS NOISE TRADERS 7
or as any owner of the asset who considers selling the asset to use the funds for some
other investment opportunity.5
As before, all players are rational and risk neutral. There is no time discounting and
the reservation value is 0 - except for S. We allow for both long and short positions,
and for futures contracts, if a prospective short seller can not borrow an asset.
3.2. Analysis. Solving the model by backward induction, we now note that the
market maker will announce the bid-ask prices
p
￿




￿ + 1 ￿ ￿
2￿ + 1
: (16)
It is easy to verify that these bid-ask prices satisfy conditions (1) ￿ (2):
If IT is a monopolist, then he maximizes pro￿ts with respect to ￿: Inserting equa-
tions (15) and (16) and taking the ￿rst order condition, we can conclude that the
equilibrium precision is given by
￿







On the other hand. if the pro￿ts are pushed to zero, for example due to competition,
then the equilibrium precision is given by ￿







Since c(￿) is convex, we know that ￿COMP ￿ ￿MON:
In 2; the expected pro￿t of NT is
E [￿NT] = ￿p
￿
B + (1 ￿ ￿)E [v] ￿ p0: (18)
He will thus accept any o⁄er that satis￿es
p0 ￿ ￿p
￿
B + (1 ￿ ￿)E [v]; (19)
and reject other o⁄ers.
Moving back to 1; the seller￿ s expected pro￿t is
E [￿S] = (1 + E [rS])p0 ￿ E [v]:
Thus, he will only give o⁄ers that satisfy
p0 ￿
E [v]
1 + E [rS]
:
5The fact that the seller possibly buys back the asset in 7 is simply a technical device to calculate
the expected pro￿t from his initial sale.ENDOGENOUS NOISE TRADERS 8
Thus for
E [v]
1 + E [rS]
￿ ￿p
￿
B + (1 ￿ ￿)E [v];
the seller will give the noise trader an o⁄er that he will accept. Reshu› ing, and inserting
(16); and E [v] = 1=2; the condition becomes
(2￿
￿ ￿ 1)￿
1 + 2￿ ￿ ￿ (2￿
￿ ￿ 1)
￿ E [rS]: (20)







B + (1 ￿ ￿)E [v]: (21)
The equilibrium required return, or equivalently, the seller￿ s cost of capital, is thus
r
￿ =










If condition (20) is not satis￿ed, then the seller can not give the noise trader an
o⁄er he will accept. In this case, the asset will thus not be sold. Since the left hand
side is strictly positive, it is not enough if E [rS] simply is strictly positive - it must be
su¢ ciently high: Thus, the seller and the noise trader must have su¢ ciently asymmetric
investment opportunities.







￿ ￿ 3￿ ￿ 1)
2 > 0: (22)
In other words, a more competitive informed trader implies that the required return
increases. Thus, although the seller may have to pay the monopolist informed trader￿ s
positive pro￿ts, he still prefers that to having to pay for the increased adverse selection
cost when the informed traders is competitive.
Also note that the bid-ask spread depends on the precision ￿; but only indirectly
on the information cost. This complements the result of G￿rleanu and Pedersen (2004)
that transaction costs increase the bid-ask spread.






+ 1 ￿ 2￿: (23)
The cost function is plotted in Figure 1 below. We have also plotted IT￿ s revenues
when ￿ = 0 and when ￿ = 1: The line 2￿￿1 corresponds to ￿ = 1: Decreasing ￿ leads
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Figure 1: The cost function and IT￿ s revenue when ￿ = 0 and ￿ = 1:























3 < 0; (26)
￿MON is increasing and concave in ￿: Figure 2 below shows how the optimal precision
changes as a function of ￿.







Figure 2: The optimal precision as a function of ￿:ENDOGENOUS NOISE TRADERS 10




















(3￿ + 1)(3￿ + 2)
(5￿ + 2)(2￿ + 1)
: (29)
Figure 3 shows equilibrium bid-ask prices as ￿ increases, as well as p￿
0 (the thin down-
ward sloping curve).














Figure 3: The bid ask spread, p￿
0; and E [v] as a function of ￿.
The horizontal line E [v] shows the expected value of the asset. Note that the spread is
not symmetric around this value. This is because noise traders trade on the bid side,
and thus push the bid price upwards.
Thus, as ￿ increases, M gets higher trading gains vis-￿-vis NT. As a result, the
possibility to make trading losses vis-￿-vis IT increases. IT can thus ￿nance more
costly information. As the precision of signals rise, the bid-ask spread also rises. The
bid-ask spread as a function of ￿ is concave for two reasons. First, since the cost
function is convex, an increase in ￿ allows a less than proportional increase in ￿ from
a cost perspective. Second, as the bid-ask spread increases in ￿, the gain from a higher
precision is also less than proportional.





(3￿ + 1)(3￿ + 2)
:
In ￿gure 4 we plot the required return as a function of ￿:ENDOGENOUS NOISE TRADERS 11









Figure 4: The required return as a function of ￿:
4. Information structure
G￿rleanu and Pedersen (2004) argued that a noise trader that also may receive an
information shock will ask for a lower required return. Here we show that this may not
always be the case. The reason is that the opportunity cost di⁄ers depending on how
the information structure is de￿ned.
First, if we assume that the noise trader becomes informed when he buys the asset,
then the asset is worth more to him and the required return decreases. This is thus in
line with G￿rleanu and Pedersen￿ s case. In fact, there are two e⁄ects. The ￿rst is that
the trader bene￿ts from being informed. The other is that if he buys, then he buys at
p0; and not at pA: Thus, he avoids the adverse selection pricing when buying.
Second, if we assume that the noise trader knows that he might receive an informa-
tional signal even if he does not buy the asset, then the opportunity cost is di⁄erent.
It is no longer zero, but strictly positive. As a result, the price he is ready to pay
decreases, and the required return increases. If this outweighs the fact that the trader
can avoid the adverse selection pricing when receiving positive signals, then G￿rleanu
and Pedersen￿ s claim is not valid.
Let us thus de￿ne a new player, a partially informed noise trader (NT;IT); who
may receive an informational signal with probability ￿ 2 [0;1]: For the purposes of
this argument, we disregard the information cost. We also treat the bid-ask prices
(15) ￿ (16) as given.6
6One interpretation is that the new player NT;IT is atomistic compared to the other representative
players. This assumption simpli￿es the argument, but does not a⁄ect it signi￿cantly.ENDOGENOUS NOISE TRADERS 12
4.1. NT becomes informed if he buys. In 2, the expected pro￿t of NT;IT is
E [￿NT;IT] = ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(p
￿
B ￿ p0) +
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￿














B ￿ 0) + (1 ￿ ￿)(p
￿




He will thus accept any o⁄er that satis￿es


















The required return is thus lower in this case if ￿ p0 ￿ p￿







which is always the case.
4.2. NT is informed even if he does not buy. In this case, the opportunity cost
changes as well. For NT;IT to buy the asset, we must have
E [￿NT;IT] ￿ E [￿IT]:
He will thus accept any o⁄er that satis￿es

































The required return is thus lower in this case if p￿
0 < ^ p0: Inserting (15)￿(16); (21);




(3￿ ￿ 1)(2￿ ￿ 1)￿
(2￿ + 1)
;




Thus, only if the probability of being informed is su¢ ciently high will the required
return be lower if the trader is informed before buying the asset. Note that the bene￿t
stems not from being informed per se, but rather from the fact that if the trader gets
a positive signal, then he has already bought in 2, which makes it possible for him to
avoid the adverse selection pricing in 6:ENDOGENOUS NOISE TRADERS 13
5. Conclusion
We have aimed to create a simple way to extend Copeland and Galai (1983) to incor-
porate endogenous noise traders. We have shown that the concept of required return
implies that the adverse selection cost ultimately is paid by the seller of the asset. It
is thus part of his cost of capital. We have framed the model so that the seller is any
owner of the asset. However, he could also be interpreted as the original issuer of the
asset. We showed that for the required return argument to be consistent with rational
pro￿t maximizing agents, the seller must have a reservation value that is su¢ ciently
above that of the buying noise trader￿ s.
A straight-forward extension would be to let noise traders be distributed over ￿:
The required return would then depend on that distribution, and on the seller￿ s need
for funds. One could also envision a model where traders are two-dimensional in the
sense that they have both an ￿ and a precision ￿: This would open up for situations
where informed traders may have to exit their positions prematurely. The next step
would then be to endogenize also when this exit will take place. Such an endogenization
would in turn open up for predatory traders. Such traders, discussed in Brunnermeier
and Pedersen (2005), actively try to push other traders across their liquidity thresholds.
Their objective is to be able to enter their positions at ￿re sale prices.
This type of two-dimensional individuals would also allow for the possibility noted
by G￿rleanu and Pedersen (2004), i.e. that a trader may trade for both informational
or liquidity reasons, and that this a⁄ects the required return. We disregarded this
possibility in the baseline model. However, we noted that their result depends on the
information structure. The required return does decrease if the noise trader becomes
informed by buying the asset. However, if he is informed already before buying the
asset, then his opportunity cost changes, and the required return may in fact increase.
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